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The Years of Temptation Continue
Economic and political relations between the two republics are probably
at the lowest level in their history. The border between Serbia and Montenegro
is the closest and most controlled border in Europe; exchange of goods has
almost been non-existent (reduced to less than 10% of the last year’s exchange
and including only few products and transport with the Port of Bar); payment
transactions have also been halted; the ruling coalition in Montenegro does not
recognize federal decisions. This is a time of full domination of policy over econ-
omy, madness over common sense.
I am of the opinion that the fundamental purpose of the blockade is eco-
nomic exhaustion of Montenegro, intended to prove that Montenegro cannot
survive alone! It is an absolutely false thesis! Nothing for free has been coming
to Montenegro. What is the impact of this blockade on the economic situation in
Montenegro?
The dependency of Montenegrin economy on the Serbian market is still
very high. Replacement of the market is expensive now and will be expensive in
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1999. I  2000 I  2000
1998. XII 1999 I  1999
GDP - USD million 14.224a) 17.626a) -19,3%   
Montenegro  1 103    
Serbia  16 523    
GDP per capita - USD 1.699a) 2.100a) -19,1%   
Montenegro  1 704    
Serbia  2 133    
Serbia proper  1 977    
Vojvodina  2 590    
Industrial production
  -24,1%  -22,8% -15,9%
Montenegro   -7,6%  -14,9% -0,8%
Serbia   -25,6%  -23,4% -16,9%
Serbia proper   -24,5%  -21,7% -13,6%
Vojvodina   -28,2%  -27,3% -24,3%
Average wage - DM 107 156 -31,7% 85 -8,8% -34,8%
Montenegro 154 180 -14,1% 147 -8,8% -2,5%
Serbia 102 155 -33,8% 80 -8,8% -37,7%
Uneployment rate 27,3% 25,2% 8,3%   
Montenegro 36,8% 34,1% 7,9%   
Serbia 26,5% 24,5% 8,2% 26,8%  
Export - USD million 1 498 2 820 -46,9% 91,7 -25,2% -46,0%
Montenegro 123 129 -4,7% 13,6 107,5% 12,8%
Serbia 1 375 2 691 -48,9% 78,1 -32,8% -50,5%
Import - USD million 3 296 4 732 -30,3% 244,2 -19,9% -34,2%
Montenegro 358 335 6,9% 17,4 -15,0% -59,9%
Serbia 2 938 4 397 -33,2% 226,8 -20,3% -30,7%
Money supply (M 1), end of period, DIN billion 16,4 10,8 51,9% 16,5 0,6% 50,8%
Cash 6,7 5,0 34,0% 6,1 -9,0% 35,4%
Deposits 9,7 5,8 67,2% 10,4 7,2% 62,5%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 1 280 -42,3% 705 -4,6% -43,0%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4,25% 6,95% -38,8% 4,04% 3,9% -42,6%
Retail price
  42,4%a)  0,5% 52,4%
Montenegro   60,1%  6,3% 130,1%
Serbia   41,1%a)  0,0% 47,8%
Living costs
  44,9%a)  1,3% 59,6%
Montenegro   67,2%  5,0% 143,8%
Serbia   43,5%a)  0,9% 54,1%
Industrial price
  44,2%a)   
Montenegro   63,7%   
Serbia   43,2%a)   
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12,6 6,7 88,1% 20,0 0,0% 143,9%
a) Official statistics, without Kosovo, unreliable
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the future. According to the research conducted by ISSP from Podgorica, 5 years ago the average dependency
ratio of  Montenegrin enterprises from the Serbian export and import market accounted for around 68%. Trade
difficulties with Serbia have forced Montenegrin enterprises to look for new markets, so the dependency ratio
before the bombing (January-March 1999) was reduced to 42%. New markets primarily refer to Italy, Bosnia and
Hercegovina and Kosovo, and lately to Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. However, for certain enterprises (Steel
Plant, Obod, Port of Bar, Tobacco factory, etc), the Serbian market accounts for 80% or more of their export mar-
ket. The trade disruption caused an increase of balance of payments deficit in Montenegro, as many goods, pre-
viously bought in Serbia in dinars (food, cereals, medications, consumer goods), must be imported now from
abroad and paid in “hard currency”. However, in conditions of the introduction of the German mark as a paral-
lel legal tender, Montenegro is confronted with these problems anyhow.
Can we expect the war epilogue in Montenegro?
Personally I believe that neither war nor internal conflicts in Montenegro can happen! The most I expect are
some incidents which will be surmounted! This attitude is maybe the result of my personal fear that this would
be a bloody conflict with far reaching catastrophic consequences to the further relations of two close and inter-
mixed nations! Still, I think that the balance of fear is such that a conflict could be avoided. In addition, emo-
tional resources for new conflicts are thinning. Generally speaking, debates are less bitter, the recent war losses
warn everyone and nobody wants to get killed in vain. Still there are divisions which must not be neglected by
all means. But they should serve not for conflicts, but for mutual tolerance and democratic dialogue, as well as
the respect of different opinions. It is my belief that such an approach clears a road ahead in Montenegro.
What could be expected? I believe that Montenegro will continually be kept in a constant political chess game,
bearing political pressure; internal conflicts will be encouraged and the conduct of economic program will be
made difficult. In a word, everything will be aimed at enabling the conditions to ensure the victory of those polit-
ical forces that are close to the ruling coalition in Serbia. Open conflict is not a target, but the maintaining of
political tensions through several actions:
a) The blockade will remain aimed at economic exhaustion of Montenegro and enticement of social
unrests (strikes in enterprises, rallies, etc.), used for political purpose;
b)  There are attempts of provocation through the YU-TV information network, which was quickly
established in Montenegro and whose repeaters are located on military objects;
c)  Enlargement of para-military forces (military police) whose number is close to 1000 people, cre-
ating an impression of domination;
d)  Federal elections - what if federal elections are announced in November and how the Montenegrin
authorities would react, bearing in mind that the legitimate President of the FRY will announce the elec-
tions;
e)  All of these potential conflicts should serve another electoral victory in Serbia.
Unlike many I do not believe that it is about an intentional policy of throwing Montenegro out of the FRY. Why
do I think that? First of all, without Montenegro, the idea of a Great Serbia is dead! And that idea is not distant
both to the regime and part of the opposition. Still, unless democratization and economic reforms in Serbia do
not come quickly, the idea of disintegration, which has been living in this region in last decades, will grow with-
in Serbia, which could be a source of new conflicts and immediate reason for Montenegro to “leave”.
What can Montenegro do in such a situation?
First of all, it should be mentioned that percentage of the population in favor of independent Montenegro
is growing larger. Around 80% of the population prefers a change of the existing status, while almost 40% sup-
ports complete independence.
Still, I think that Montenegro must not take any step which might provoke internal conflicts.  Maximal
patience and tolerance could be much wiser than sudden moves and radical decisions. We must be aware that
we share the cage with a python!
Great majority of the people in Montenegro has broken up ties mentally with the ruling regime in Serbia,
the FRY no longer exists, either within or without. Nobody recognizes it abroad and it doesn’t function within.
However, the cooperation with a future democratic, open and pro-European Serbia should be maintained.
Nothing should be done to jeopardize these ties or to discourage them tomorrow. A community or sort of coop-
eration resulting from democratic decisions of both nations and motivated more by the future and less by the
past should be established. Therefore, the developing and facilitating of the relations with Serbian opposition and
other democratic forces is of utmost importance, together with economic, sport and cultural ties.
Fostering of the integration processes between Montenegro and former Yugoslav republics, particularly
after the victory of opposition in Croatia, is one of the possible solutions to improve the conduct of economic
reforms and to mitigate a part of difficulties which all former republics bear due to the political situation in
Serbia. Opening of Montenegro is the answer to many problems which now exist. Such an opening costs a lot,
but is inevitable!
Montenegro should proceed with economic reforms, the building of new institutions, i.e. with realization
of the economic sovereignty concept, and it should employ the assistance it now receives primarily to improve
systematic and structural adjustments of its economy. With the further support to democratic process in
Montenegro (regardless of many statements claiming that democracy has already been adopted), Montenegro
does not need a nation-based concept of sovereignty. It needs to strive towards independence on the basis of the
principles of democracy, pluralism, multi-ethnicity and international cooperation and integration in Europe. It is
not important how old Montenegro is but how to become a democratic state and a part of Europe.
For such a vision of Montenegro, it is important to open the process of democratization in Serbia, which
assumes the end of its international isolation, opening and speeding up of economic reforms. A closed system is
not an ally to democratic forces and free will of the citizens.
I truly believe that the old model of unity has already been worn out and that only  democratic and eco-
nomically reformed Serbia, together with democratic and reformed Montenegro can establish new relations and
look forward to a joint future.
Srbolijub Antic
THE YUGOSLAV ENERGY SECTOR – WINTER ROPE DANCING
Numerous external disturbances accompanied by a breakdown of existing institutions and inexpert economic
policy, are the principal causes of the disastrous economic situation in Yugoslavia.  In a constellation where the
largest number of institutions has sunk to the image of their own caricatures, the existing economic structure is
attempting to survive by postponing serious reforms.  There is still no legal security, domestic currency is non-
convertible, the banking sector is facing collapse, and prices are rigidly controlled, as well as foreign trade.
Privatization is too slow, it has not started in state-owned companies and the banking sector.  In such a situa-
tion, it is not strange that frequent shortages of main food articles are interpreted and proclaimed as results of
successful market and price stabilization.
In the overall collapse of the system, the energy sector was used as one of the social shock absorbers.  Low
prices of energy products somewhat protected the standard of living, of course only under conditions where ener-
gy-producing companies managed to maintain production and partly satisfy demands.  A large part of capital
derived from the energy sector poured into the population sector and other sectors of economy1, which will sure-
ly have an immeasurable and grave affect upon its future development.  At the same time, the energy sector is a
field where the lack of a transparent system of regulation, i.e. the domination of discretionary state decision-mak-
ing, especially during the period of UN sanctions, accounted for a vast redistribution of property.  
The stated unfavorable processes gained momentum after the NATO bombing, which was used as an alibi for
all former mistakes.  The bombing was directed, apart from industry, at the energy sector where direct damage
is estimated to around 870 million USD2 (600 million USD in the oil industry and 270 million USD in the elec-
tric power industry).  
The brief review that follows will give a survey of the situation in fields of the energy sector during the last win-
ter season, along with an outline of a desired role of the state in the energy sector. Special attention will be given
to estimates of deficits of all energy products during wintertime, which were largely inaccurate, and to the rea-
sons that eliminated the possibilities of a breakdown of energy systems.                 
The electric power industry
The electric power system in Yugoslavia consists of two electric power companies that are wholly or predomi-
nantly owned by republics, which is, or was, a usual occurrence in federal states.  The structure of both compa-
nies is not adapted to contemporary trends and regulations as put forth by the EU.  They continue to be verti-
cally and horizontally integrated monopolies, where the Electric Power System of Serbia also includes the coal-
mining industry.
Both electric power inustries dispose of a total of 9,2 GW of power; the Electric Power System of Serbia has 8,3
GW, and the Electric Power of Montenegro has 890 MW of installed power. The capacity of the Electric Power
System of Serbia can be considered as nominal since the status of two thermal plants in Kosovo (1,2 GW) is
uncertain.  Due to improper maintenance, several units in other thermal plants have not been used for  years.
Experts from the Electric Power System of Serbia have estimated that thermal power plants provide 3,5 GW out
of around 5,5 GW of nominal power.
In the period before the bombing, transmission capacities were not a bottleneck for supplying consumers with
power. Bombing directed at the transmission in Serbia severely reduced the existing capacities. The situation
would have been a lot worse had the Electric Power System of Serbia not transferred, with expert assistance, sev-
eral transformers to key locations that upgrade system stability. Even in that situation the transmission
remained a bottleneck that was eluded by maximum imports from alternative foreign sources. The distributive
segment of the Electric Power System of Serbia and the Electric Power of Montenegro, did not suffer heavy dam-
ages.
Taking into account the limitations of production and transmission capacities of the Electric Power System in
Serbia, the question arises over how reductions of electric power supply had not been more severe and frequent.
Daily reductions lasting two to four hours were registered at the end of November and in the last ten days of
January. With regard to prognosis of a lack of 30-50%3 of electric power during wintertime, reductions have been
very modest.
Three key factors contributed to the absence of greater reductions.  Firstly, outstanding hydrological conditions
that enabled maximum daily production of 100 to 110 million KWh.  This is best illustrated by the example of
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the river Drina flow, which reached 2,000 cubic meters per second in November and December of last year,
instead of the average flow of 300 to 400 cubic meters, i.e. the 200 cubic meters average for the months of
November and December.  The Danube river has also been in its long-term cycle of high water level for the past
four years (its high and low water level cycles repeat every fifteen years).  Hydro meteorological statistics reveal
record precipitation for November and December ever since statistics have been kept.  The surplus of water
was used to pump water into lakes of reversible electric power plant, while there were cases when the inflow
was so large that overflows had to take place.  
Although there existed indicators of a water surplus, and the high production of hydroelectric plants, prog-
nosis did not take them into account. Almost all forecasts were based on the assumption that “favorable hydro
meteorological conditions from earlier years are highly unlikely to repeat”4.  Prognosis came true only with
regard to the fact that the total production of the Electric Power System in Serbia decreased, although it was
a decrease of only 8%.  
Imports of electric power were the second factor that enabled a relatively normal supply to consumers.  The
Electric Power System of Serbia imported electric power all through December and January.  Imports usually
took the form of debt to be returned in the summer.  This method could not be applied last year, since the
Electric Power System of Serbia was not able to respond to the barter obligation.  The first problems arose as
early as November, and the Electric Power System of Serbia solved them by unauthorized and unannounced
loans from surrounding systems.  This did not last long, since
imports on a commercial basis started.  Imports covered around
20 to 30% of electric power consumption in the coldest days of
winter.  Sources that financed imports are not transparent, while
estimates deal with a figure of a few tens of millions of USD. 
Finally, monthly consumption of electric power during the win-
ter months of 1999 and 2000 has been lower in comparison to
the same months in earlier years.  Available data for November
and December 1999 and January 2000 show a decrease in elec-
tric power consumption of around 8 to 10% as compared to last
winter.  
The fall of consumption occurred for several reasons, the most
important being a cease in the working process of large industri-
al consumers, and the fact that the dependence of electric power consumption on temperature has dropped
slightly.  Thus the daily consumption of electric power at a temperature of 0 degrees Centigrade dropped to
126 million KWh this winter, from around 129 million KWh in the past years.  
A certain effect came about through a sort of "demand side" campaign over possible shortages of electric
power.  The campaign, that was more a reflection of experienced destruction and awareness of long-term
improper maintenance of the electric power system, even fear of uncertainty, resulted in opting for alternative
modes of heating by a smaller number of consumers.  Such a small alteration was beneficial to the electric
power system since it reduced consumption, however it was harmful to society as a whole because funds were
partly invested into expensive alternative heating technologies.
Apart from the decrease in overall consumption, a reduction of peak loads has also been registered.  The
maximum hourly peak load this winter was 6,7 GW, which is 4% less than the maximum peak load recorded
in 1998 (7,1 GW).  It is indicative that maximum peak loads were registered before holidays, which were pre-
ceded by days with temperatures of around -10 degrees Centigrade, so that a thorough comparison between
peak loads this winter and those of the winters before is possible.  Fluctuations of peak loads demonstrate that
a number of consumers have definitely turned to alternative heating energy products.  
Although electric power production was lower as compared to previous years, consumption was met by
increased imports, while reductions were relatively mild.  Favorable hydrology enabled high electric power con-
sumption for heating during the severely cold months of December 1999 and January 2000.  Good hydrology
and high production by hydroelectric power plants had two more effects.  Production costs decreased signifi-
cantly in the Electric Power System of Serbia because hydroelectric plants do not use fuel, while thermal capac-
ities that have greater operation costs were used less.  Relying upon hydro capacities decreased the possibili-
ties of damage and falling out of thermoelectric plants, which used to be extremely high.  It is notable that the
low cost of electric power and the paying of pensions with coupons for electricity did not lead to an increase of
consumption, which shows that a successful "demand side management" campaign is possible even in the
existing conditions.  The fact that the campaign was based on intensifying an atmosphere of uncertainty with
regard to the supply of consumers, instead of being based upon price incentive, does not essentially change
the assessment of its success.   
The oil industry
The oil industry structure denotes the existence of monopolies in oil production and processing, and the
transport and distribution of natural gas.  The segment of oil derivatives' distribution includes companies
owned by the two republics, and a number of private and socially-owned companies.  
The production of crude oil in Yugoslavia amounts to around 1 million tons annually5, which cover 20-25%
of domestic needs.  Statistics show that crude oil production did not stop during the bombing, although it did
decrease.  A month after the bombing had stopped, crude oil production returned to its usual level (55-75 thou-
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sand tons per month).
Oil processing took place in two refineries with 7.5 million tons of total primary capacity.  The Pancevo refin-
ery is of the conversional type, with numerous secondary capacities.  The primary system capacity was around
4.5 million of crude oil.  Novi Sad has a refinery of the hydro skimming type, with primary processing capacity
of 3 million tons of crude oil.  Both refineries are connected with a two-way pipeline, so that the two separate
entities can be considered as one integrated system.  Both have good locations on the Danube that enable
waterway supplying, and an alternative supply route through a pipeline from the Croatian port of Rijeka.  With
regard to the consumption of derivatives, both have central locations and pipeline connections with petro-
chemical industrial facilities.  The refineries in Pancevo and Novi Sad were permanent targets of bombing that
inflicted heavy damage upon both.  Petrochemical facilities also suffered heavy damage, and they have not yet
been fully repaired.  
In spite of loud announcements, re-established production has been modest and reaches a maximum of 150
thousand tons per month.  The EU fuel ban disables imports of crude oil, however they would be superfluous
at the present moment since refineries cannot process larger quantities.  Processing of domestic oil is carried
out only in parts of refineries that are not on a satisfactory technological level. Both refineries have had prob-
lems with the quality of derivatives and profundity of
processing even before the bombing.  Export of domes-
tic fuel to the EU has not been possible since the mid-
dle of the decade, because refineries could not techno-
logically satisfy high ecological standards. Modest re-
establishment of derivative production is based on uti-
lizing primary  facilities that produce diesel and heavy
fuel oil, but cannot produce white derivatives in larger
quantities.  
Shortages of heavy and diesel occurred throughout
the heating season in heating plants, as well as in
facilities that are not connected to heating plants.  The
shortages affected a growth of electric power con-
sumption, since hospitals, kindergartens and schools
have no other heating alternative.
The inability to produce sufficient amounts and a variety of derivatives in domestic refinery facilities is only
one of the causes of massive shortages.  The derivatives' import alternative was not profitable, since prices were
kept artificially law. Under such conditions, the black market of derivatives reactivated, based on illegal imports
and distribution.  The extent of derivatives' consumption has been approximately evaluated for years, which
only serves to describe the nature of this obscure phenomenon and signifies that there have been no precise
data on the import and distribution of these products.
Regular sale of petrol and diesel oil at state-owned gas stations started by the end of February this year, on
account of new prices that are lower than in any neighboring country.  This kind of scheme enables the state
to promote itself as a "successful" stabilizing factor in the supply of derivatives.  Thus the practice of advertis-
ing everything that is common in every civilized country as a great success continues.  An answer to the ques-
tion of whether a more stable supply of derivatives could be expected in the months to come will depend upon
the fluctuations of the dinar exchange rate, and the pressure of people close to the regime for restoring privi-
leges that accompany the illegal import of derivatives.  It is evident that derivatives sold at gas stations do not
come from domestic refineries but imports.  The increase of production in our refineries will have to wait for
more fortunate times.  
Gas
The consumption of gas is undergoing expansion in Yugoslavia mostly because of its favorable ecological
characteristics.  Major gas lines and its distributive net-
work have almost been completed in the Vojvodina
region, where there is a high extent of household gasifi-
cation.  Central Serbia has only major gas lines for sup-
plying industrial consumers, while distribution among
households is not developed.  Kosovo and Montenegro do
not use gas.
Domestic gas production has been oscillating around
the amount of 0.6 billion cubic meters for years, while
consumption has reached around 2.5 billion cubic
meters.  The difference between production and con-
sumption is covered by import from Russia.  In the course
of 1999, gas import was halved and reached little over 1
billion cubic meters.  In November and December import
increased, however it is still 15-20% less than the planned and needed quantities.  Problems with importing
and shipping companies had adverse influence on making gas for heating available.  Remote central heating
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plants that use gas were forced to shorten the time span and reduce the quality of heating. 
Coal
Low-quality coal is the main domestic energy potential, because of its great advantage of surface exploitation.
Production of electric power is its only rational use, so that it is sold "through the wire".  Around 90-95% of lig-
nite production from surface exploitation is used in thermal plants.
Production from surface sites has decreased from around 43 million tons of coal in 1998, to 32 million tons
in 1999.  The fall of production is most apparent in Kosovo, but even surface exploitation in Kolubara registered
a drop of 5 million tons of coal.  Favorable hydrology enabled the sufficient production of electric power in spite
of this setback.       
Under conditions that indicated shortages of energy products during wintertime, a decision was passed to
substantially lower the prices of domestic lignite for wide consumption.  Just like electric power, coal could be
bought for pension coupons.  Thus the substitution of electric power by coal for heating purposes was encour-
aged, to the disadvantage of coal producers however.  At the same time, the already created demand for solid
fuel heating stoves (of the popular "smederevac" kind) was sustained.
Expectations and predictions of a collapse of energy systems in Yugoslavia during wintertime, and Serbia in
particular, did not come true.  Reasons for that are numerous, beginning with natural conditions (hydrology),
to psychological reasons that form demand, and account for the consumption decrease of key energy products
and the shift to available alternative energy sources.  A situation where the electric power system is frequently
on the verge of collapse, and the domestic oil industry is not able to produce quality derivatives, is not a thriv-
ing one.  The absence of a realistic plan of energy sector development, which would define the roles of specific
actors (the state, companies, investors, consumers) and set attainable goals, is a great impediment that might
lead to similar problems in the following winter.
The future role of the state in the energy sector depends upon the survival of the existing model of political
and economic inter-dependency.  There is a deep-rooted opinion that political changes, often viewed as a swift
breakdown of the old system, can be induced by economic problems.  The desire for political changes resound-
ed in the energy sector as well, when the winter that followed bombing was expected to be a sort of test to result
in political implications6.  It seems that the government and opposition, and a majority of experts, thought in
these terms in expectation of an outcome that would depend upon the regularity of energy products' supply,
each according to their own interest, of course.  
Relating political events to possible problems in the supply of electric power, or other energy products for
heating, denotes a concealed consent to the importance of the state in the energy sector.  In the case of either
option, the state is obliged to provide stable supplies of energy products to economy and the population.  While
this attitude is understandable from the governments' colectivist point of view, the opposition should have a con-
siderable reserve on the issue.  
The author of this paper is of the opinion that the role of the state in the energy sector should be restricted
to ensuring and protecting competition wherever possible, and to establishing transparent regulation in the case
of natural monopolies.  This role does not exclude partial ownership of the state in the energy sector, but it does
not regard the state as the principal supplier.  Under conditions of clear- cut property relations, and transpar-
ent competition and regulation, there is no need for the state to provide energy products for anyone.  New own-
ers who satisfy and adapt their business interests in conformance with basic social goals will be the ones to deal
with the problem, under conditions of fair competition and within regulations in the energy sector.  If energy
products are viewed as goods, there would be no need for the state to provide heating and electric power to both
economy and the population.  Private producers would carry out that role with much more success.
With that kind of a role of the state, it should be kept in mind that the energy sector, the electric power sys-
tem in particular, can endure suppressed prices for a relatively long time period. The recovery of this sector,
however, requires extensive time and very complex regulation.  The motive for this remark is related to the unre-
alistic expectations of soon recovery of the energy sector after the bombing.
Mladjan Dinkic
Economic Activity
In January 2000, industrial production in the FRY dropped by 22.8% compared to the month before, where
in Serbia it went down by 23.4% and in Montenegro by 14.9%. Industrial production in Montenegro in January
this year was 0.8% lower than in January last year, mostly due to seasonal factors. Contrary to that, drastic
decline of industrial production in January in Serbia was the result of the factors other than seasonal. Namely,
industrial production in Serbia in January 2000 was 16.9% lower than it was in January 1999, when the same
seasonal factors were in effect (Christmas and New Year holidays). Hence, the industry of Serbia goes through
systematic crisis, with no signs of recovery in the nearest future. The level of industrial production in Serbia in
January 2000 was by 78% lower than in January 1989.
With respect to industrial sectors and compared to January last year, only 5 sectors in the FRY marked the
growth: oil and gas production (+24.5%), ferrous metallurgy (+14.6%), paper production and processing (+9.2%),
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shipbuilding (+7.0%) and power industry
(+3.2%). In all other sectors the production fell
by -1.8% (wood production) or -60.5% (oil
derivatives production).
Wages
Real wages expressed in the German marks
were reduced by 8.8% in January, compared to
the month before, where Serbia and
Montenegro sustained an equal drop. The fall
in January was expected, taking into account
usual rise before New Year and restrictions in
the months to follow.
Relatively speaking, the trend of the real
wages drop is far more obvious in Serbia than
in Montenegro. Average wages in Serbia in
January, accounted for DM 80, were by 37.7%
lower than in On the other hand, average
wages in Montenegro in January, accounted
for DM 147, were by 2.5% lower than in
January last year.
Foreign trade
In January 2000 exports from Serbia were
halved compared to January 1999 (-50.5%),
while imports went down by almost one third
(30.7%), with foreign trade deficit of USD 149 million. In comparison to January 1999, import of oil deriva-
tives marked the largest growth (+91.7%), which is a consequence of the destruction of Serbian oil process-
ing capacities, caused by NATO bombing. It is worth mentioning that such a significant import increase was
achieved despite the EU oil embargo, which proves its inefficiency and purposelessness. 
Meanwhile, Montenegrin exports rose by 12.8%, while imports went down by 60% compared to January
1999, thus reducing foreign trade deficit by USD 3.8 million. A significant share in the structure of
Montenegrin imports belongs to oil derivatives (over 1/5 of total imports in January), thus producing a very
large portion of the total Montenegrin fiscal revenues.
In the beginning of February 2000, by the Serbian govern-
ment decree, the trade with Montenegro was completely halt-
ed, aimed at political destabilization of its leadership. Within
such measures, most of the trade with Macedonia and BiH
(Republika Srpska) was also halted, so as to prevent re-
exports to Montenegro. In this manner, and contrary to the
Federal Constitution, Serbia overtook prerogatives of the fed-
eral government in the sphere of foreign trade policy. Out of
political reasons Serbia gave up its largest export markets,
where it used to realize one third of the total export income
in the last year (USD 480 million), risking to lose them per-
manently. This is already the third time in the last 12 years
that Milosevic’s regime, through the introduction of “internal
economic sanctions” attempts to discipline leaderships of the
Yugoslav republics where it lost political control over them.
Let us recall that similar sanctions were introduced against
Slovenia (December 1, 1989) and Republika Srpska (August
4, 1994). Lessons from those events prove that such sanc-
tions always had a “boomerang effect”, as the citizens and
economy of Serbia always born the most negative conse-
quences. Meanwhile, the sanctions failed to achieve its pri-
mary political purpose - overtaking of political power in the
republics they were imposed against. Instead of that, they
sooner or later led to their independence from the Yugoslav state. However, Milosevic has always managed
to achieve his secondary political goal - to stay in power on a progressively smaller territory of “Yugoslavia”.
Monetary movements, exchange rates and prices
A. Serbia
During January 2000, the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) strictly controlled the money supply (M1),
which rose by only 0.6% in relation to the end of the year before. However, by the start of February, there
occurred a monetary expansion, so that money supply in the third week of February reached the amount of
Industrial production in Serbia and Montenegro
january 1994 - january 2000.
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DIN 17 billion. That growth was the result of the NBY’s direct investment to the state from primary issue (the
increase of DIN 600 million compared to the end of 1999).
The money supply structure was significantly changed in January and February 2000. The third week of
February inclusive, cash volume in circulation was reduced by around a billion dinars, compared to the begin-
ning of the year, but deposits were meanwhile increased by 1.6 billion of dinars. That produced at the end of
February a relatively large discrepancy between the black market and giro exchange rate (21-28 din/DM). The
NBY intervened from foreign currency reserves (- DM 20 million) and significantly withdrew cash money from
the circulation thus trying to halt the exchange rate growth, but it was only partially successful. By the end of
February, the black market exchange rate rose by 5% and giro rate rose by 12%, compared to that in January.
After zero inflation in January (official statistics), but with shortage of almost all goods under the adminis-
trative control (bread, milk, petrol, sugar, cooking oil, etc.), the government of Serbia decided at the end of
February to start up with a gradual unfreezing of prices. Petrol price rose by 75% and diesel price rose by 115%,
thus bringing the petrol from streets back to petrol stations. It is absolutely clear that gradual unfreezing of
prices aimed at preventing further shortages of goods will lead to strong inflatory pressures in the months to
follow, which is in accordance with our anticipation that the effect of repressed inflation from the previous year
will emerge in its full size during this year. 
Apart from disparity problems, caused by ill-conducted economic policy, the regime in Serbia has to solve
the problem of establishing a real level of official exchange rate. Although the NBY considers very much the offi-
cial devaluation of the dinar, that has constantly been postponed out of the fear from inevitably negative con-
sequences. It is obvious that the NBY has long time ago fail to notice the real moment for devaluation, further
delay of which diminishes its effects. One of dilemmas that are impossible to solve in the existing political and
economic conditions is the issue on what level the official exchange rate should be fixed, taking into account a
huge difference between the black market and giro exchange rate. Should a new official exchange rate was
established at the level close to the black market rate (around 22 dinars for one DM), and should businessmen
were enabled free purchase and sale of foreign currency in banks (only in that case official devaluation would
make sense), there would come relatively swift thawing of although modest foreign currency reserves and fac-
tual leaving of a newly established exchange rate. On the other hand, should the official rate was determined
at the level of giro exchange rate (26-28 din/DM), it would provoke a price blow with negative results of other
kind.
B. Montenegro
After the introduction of a dual currency monetary system, Montenegro experiences an intensive process of
official “dollarization”. Dinars are being removed from circulation with a progressively larger share of the
German mark as a parallel legal tender. This process has been accelerated after Serbia’s decision to stop the
trade and payment transactions with Montenegro. In the moment of the introduction of a dual currency sys-
tem in November 1999, the total money supply in Montenegro accounted for DM 73 million, while its foreign
currency share was around DM 20 million. By mid February foreign currency money supply was increased
three times, reaching the amount of around DM 70 million, while the dinars share was reduced to only DM 18
million. Total money supply in mid February was DM 88 million, which accounted for 20.5% growth, compared
to that at the beginning of monetary reform.
Pursuant to very high inflation in December (20.8%), price growth expressed in the German marks contin-
ued to January 2000, accounted for 6.3%. Price growth in the German marks is the largest problem to which
the monetary policy creators in Montenegro are confronted. This problem emerged primarily for two reasons:
(1) economic blockade imposed by Serbia; (2) adequate mechanisms for regulation of the sum of the German
marks in circulation were not applied. On one hand, the interruption of trade and payment transactions by
Serbia has forced Montenegro to import the goods from other markets under higher (non-depressed) prices,
which has a shock effect which usually follows after sudden price liberalization in the countries in transition.
On the other hand, a dual currency system has led to the legalization of a part of transactions which were pre-
viously conducted in the shadow economy, which caused the increase of money supply in the German marks
beyond the needs and current capacities of non-restructured economy.
In order to achieve a permanent stabilization of prices in the German marks, monetary authorities of
Montenegro should urgently establish the appropriate mechanisms for the regulation of the sum of foreign cur-
rency in circulation. Banking system should play the major role and it should be integrated in the world finan-
cial market as soon as possible. Excess of the foreign currency offer that might occur should be invested abroad
(a simple conversion of cash holdings into deposits), while in case of the increased domestic money demand,
the banks will reduce their foreign deposits and thus establish a monetary balance again. In addition, the state
could issue the relevant securities and indirectly solve the money circulation by their purchase and sale.  
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